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Abstract
As a financial institution that clears and settles payments for equity and other
securities, a clearinghouse essentially reduces the counterparty risk. It diminishes the risk
of one party failing to meet its obligations, and makes markets more efficient through
netting. This paper examines the impact of the establishment of the Day Clearing Branch
on April 26, 1920, which allowed the NYSE Clearinghouse to net cash values and clear
loans, supposedly resulting in savings in banking, time, and labor. The common and
preferred equity securities that traded on the NYSE during the year 1920 were analyzed.
The effect on bid-ask spreads and volume traded were scrutinized. It was found that these
securities had increases in bid-ask spreads and decreases in volume traded, contrary to
prior hypotheses.

v

I. Introduction
A clearinghouse is a financial institution which provides clearing and settlement
services for financial and commodities derivatives and securities transactions. In other
words, the clearinghouse acts as a middleman between a buyer and a seller to ensure the
quality and efficiency of the trade. The processes included are reporting/monitoring, risk
margining, netting of trades to single positions, tax handling, and failure handling. In
return for these services, the clearing members are required to pay a fee to the
clearinghouse. In addition, the clearinghouse removes the counterparty risk as well as a
lot of paperwork and messages that would otherwise need to be sent in order to verify the
quality of the transaction.
An important attribute of a clearinghouse is the ability to net trades. Netting
involves offsetting opposite trades in order to settle transactions in a cleaner way,
requiring fewer securities and less capital. For example, if Company A decides to buy
400 shares of stock X from Company B, but had also already sold Company B 500 shares
of X earlier in the day, then, without netting, both transactions together would involve
900 shares of X. In addition, assuming the cost of X is $100, there would also be a bank
credit of $90,000, and trips to both brokerage offices and both banks would need to be
made. However, with netting in effect, the 400 and 500 share trades would offset one
another, and A would deliver only the balance of 100 shares to B, resulting in a bank
credit of just $10,000 and one single trip to the brokerage office and bank (Meeker,
1922). The Night Clearing Branch of the Stock Clearing Corporation has the ability to net
trades involving the same stock. However, the establishment of the Day Clearing Branch
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has improved the efficiency of the clearinghouse by netting not only trades of the same
stock, but cash balances as well.
The ability to net trades reduces the trading costs for market makers, since they do
not need to hold as much cash in order to make daily trades. This increased market
efficiency should be passed down to traders through the form of smaller bid-ask spreads.
The hypothesis that is tested is the effect of the establishment of the Day Clearing Branch
of the NYSE on lowering bid-ask spreads. The additional services provided from the Day
Clearing Branch are twofold: the ability to net cash balances and to clear cash extensions
of balance contracts. Through examining firms before and after April 26, 1920, the date
that the Day Clearing Branch was established, and controlling for determinants of bid-ask
spreads such as volume, size, volatility, and interest rates, this conclusion is reached.
Both of these aspects further decrease the amount of cash traders need to hold, thereby
increasing market efficiency. Therefore, the establishment of the Day Clearing Branch
should result in the reduction of bid-ask spreads.
Although there is literature on the determinants of transaction costs, there is
surprisingly little literature on the effect of firms joining a clearinghouse and even less on
the effect of institutions, which implement trade netting such as the Day Clearing Branch
of the Stock Clearing Corporation.
In the following section, this paper examines the history of the NYSE
Clearinghouse. Section III evaluates previous literature dealing with the determinants of
bid-ask spreads. Section IV describes data collection and methodology. Section V
continues by presenting and summarizing the data through regression analysis. Lastly,
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Section VI concludes the findings and investigates possible opportunities in the future to
further this research.

II. History of the NYSE Clearinghouse
In the pre-clearinghouse days, a selling firm would send a messenger to deliver a
ticket with transaction details to a buying firm. Then, if the terms were agreed upon, both
firms would keep a copy of the ticket. However, throughout the 1800s, the trade volume
was steadily increasing, which made this system impracticable because the messengers
could not deliver in time. Another large problem was the strain that was put on banks for
financing these transactions. The broker needed a temporary banking accommodation for
a few hours each day in order to make payment to the deliverer of stock. The bank would
require the broker to keep a certain amount of cash in the bank before he could take out a
loan. The situation would only get more complicated if a stock traded many times
throughout the day. If person A sold to B who sold to C who then sold to D, four
different messengers and bank balances were needed. Since the only direct profit the
bank could make for providing these loans was a few hours to a day of interest, both the
banks and brokers could have benefited from a better system.
On May 17, 1892, the NYSE Stock Clearing House was established to address
these issues. The clearinghouse cleared trades on the NYSE and eliminated counterparty
risk. The ability to net trades also made markets more efficient. The protocol whenever a
trade was made, was for both parties to make sure it was recorded properly on the
exchange, and then for the clearinghouse to distribute the tickets to both parties to keep,
in order to compare it to their own records of the transaction.
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The Stock Clearing House system was a feasible temporary solution. However,
the volume of trades steadily continued to increase. This only led to increased strain on
American credit facilities during and after the Great War, which created the need for an
expanded clearance system. The Stock Clearing Corporation was established to fulfill
these demands. The former Stock Clearing House was now dubbed the Night Clearing
Branch, and the addition of the Day Clearing Branch cleared the cash values of security
balances and of shifted security loans as well. The funds of the Stock Clearing
Corporation were deposited as an ever-liquid fund, payable on demand in the event of
counterparty failure.
The Day Clearing Branch’s ability to net cash balances was essential for
dampening the effect of trading on loans. For example, if a firm had to deliver 300 shares
of stock A and received 200 shares of stock B, simply netting stock balances would not
have any effect. However, assuming a price of $95/share for stock A and $94/share for
stock B, the firm should obtain $28,500 and pay $18,800. Before, this would require
$47,300 of bank credit but with netting, the firm can simply obtain the balance of $9,700.
Another essential aspect of the Day Clearing Branch was its ability to clear loans.
Since the transactions of securities required credit accommodation by means of collateral
time and demand or call loans, the constant receiving and repaying of call loans had
placed a large burden on New York banks. Before the establishment of the Day Clearing
Branch, a firm that was trying to trade based off of loans could easily find itself in a
dilemma. If a firm had a loan for $100,000 called by bank A, the commission house
could create an agreement with bank B to borrow a similar sum to pay back A. However,
the firm would not be able to obtain the collateral from bank A before it had B’s check,
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and the firm would not be able to receive B’s check without the collateral that it had in A
(Meeker, 1922).
The Day Clearing Branch greatly alleviated this cumbersome process. For
example, suppose a clearing member had a stock balance of 1,000 shares of A to deliver
at $100 and 200 shares of B to receive at $80 as well as a loan of $100,000 called by the
bank. With the help of the Day Clearing Branch, the delivery of A would result in a credit
of $100,000 and B would result in a debit of $16,000, summing up to the total credit
balance of $84,000 to the Stock Clearing Corporation. After considering interest, before
loans were cleared, the firm would have to muster up $100,016.67 from some location to
pay back the old loan. After loans were cleared, the firm could settle everything with a
check to the Stock Clearing Corporation for $16,016.67 at the end of the day (Meeker,
1922).
The influence of a clearinghouse has been essential to both banks and traders.
There has been large savings of about 60 percent in banking accommodation due to the
decrease in the amount and timing of bank loans Meeker, 1922). The dramatic reduction
in necessary bank credit has been beneficial as well in preventing the stock market from
being warped by conditions in the money market (Meeker, 1922). In addition, the amount
of time that has been saved due to the settlement of intermediate contracts and
supervision of the deliveries of stocks has prevented a breakdown in the stock market
(Meeker, 1922). A third method of savings enacted through the establishment of the
clearinghouse has been the reduction of labor. The steady increase of trades due to the
growth in the economy would have made the daily settlement system physically
impossible. It has resulted in a decrease in the auditing and delivering work of clerks and
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messengers as well as firm members themselves in comparison to the pre-clearinghouse
days (Meeker, 1922).
The Day Clearing Branch has created a dramatic reduction in banking, time, and
labor. Its ability to clear cash extensions of balance contracts has brought further savings
that amount to about 60 percent of the value of the balance contracts remaining from the
work of the Night Clearing Branch (Meeker, 1922). In addition, the clearance of loans
through the Stock Clearing Corporation has resulted in a decrease in the number of
checks drawn by nearly 92 percent (Meeker, 1922). The additional savings of time and
labor has greatly reduced the amount of accommodation needed to pay for them. There
has also been increased flexibility imparted to the stock market by freeing it from
technical conditions in the money market (Meeker, 1922).
In the late 1800s, the NYSE faced challenges from other exchanges, most notably
the Consolidated Stock Exchange, with 2,403 members (Michie, 1986). Because there
existed a great rivalry between these two, the NYSE forbade its members to belong to
both institutions, and tried to stop communication between the two floors. In fact, the
New York Stock Exchange created artificial barriers to prevent the Consolidated from
gaining ready access to current prices on the main market, forcing it to deal at wider
prices (Michie, 1986). However, the Consolidated was attractive because it charged only
1/16 percent whereas the NYSE charged 1/8 percent due to regulation requirements that
placed a floor on the rate they could charge. Although NYSE members were forbidden to
have telephonic links with members of the Consolidated Stock Exchange, the practice
continued through third parties, such as members of other exchanges who had legitimate
access to New York prices (Michie 1986). In order to avoid paying the high fees of the
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NYSE, these third parties would obtain information through technological means and
trade on the Consolidated as well as the street, or the “curb” market. Because it was so
difficult to monitor and control the leakage of information, the increased competition
created a reduction in bid-ask spreads (Brown et al. 2008).

III. Literature Review
In previous academic literature, there have been found to be three primary reasons
for the existence of bid-ask spreads: asymmetric information, monopoly power, and an
inventory holding premium.
The discrepancy of information between two parties is critical to returns. Even
when the specialist is risk-neutral and the expected value of profits is zero, there is a
positive bid-ask spread when dealing with the presence of traders with superior
information. This shows the difference between observable and realizable returns, which
is created by the disparity in information (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). By having more
knowledge than the other party, the risks associated with transactions are minimized,
thereby creating the spread. In previous research, after estimating a model for bid-ask
spreads for the NYSE from 1981 to 1983, Glosten and Harris cannot reject the hypothesis
that NYSE common stock spreads are due to asymmetric information.
Research has shown that bid-ask spreads are a positive function of the price level
and return variance and a negative function of measures of market activity, depth, and
continuity (Copeland and Galai, 1983). The bid-ask spread increases with greater price
volatility in the asset being traded, with a higher asset price level, and with lower volume
(Copeland and Galai, 1983). Within the model that they constructed, they also found that
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a rational dealer will always set an ask price higher and a bid price lower than what he
believes the “true” market price is (Copeland and Galai, 1983).
The four determinants of spreads: activity, risk, information, and competition
(McInish and Wood, 1992) need to be closely examined with respect to the establishment
of the Stock Clearing Corporation in 1920. The increasing volume of trades along with
the difference in risk and information between the market maker and the other party
affect the bid ask spread in a vacuum. The adverse selection component of bid-ask
spreads increases uniformly with trade size. (Lin, Sanger, and Booth, 1995).
A monopoly power can affect bid-ask spreads as shown in history. In a paper by
Brown, Mulherin, and Weidenmier (2008), the rivalry between the Consolidated Stock
Exchange and the NYSE is closely looked at. The spreads before and after 1885 when
this rivalry was enacted were examined and compared. After controlling for the price of
the security, the trading activity, return volatility, and market conditions, they found that
the bid-ask spreads narrowed significantly after the creation of the Consolidated Stock
Exchange. They found a 10 percent decrease in the bid-ask spread, which was attributed
to the difference between a monopoly and a market with two competitors. In addition,
because of this lower cost, consumer welfare improved by an amount equivalent to
US$9.6 billion today. (Brown et al. 2008).
Stoll researched the inventory holding model’s effect on bid-ask spreads in 1978.
Since the intermediaries must hold inventory and run risks when being in possession of
that inventory, they post bid-ask spreads in order to rebalance his portfolio (Stoll, 1978).
The dealer must increase both bid and ask prices after he sells and lower both bid and ask
prices after he buys to equilibrate the inventory. The dealer changes the price of the
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spread to the relative true spread in order to allow the transaction to rebalance his
portfolio (Stoll, 1978). Therefore, the spread should reflect the inventory holding
premium, which is dependent on 4 factors: the dollar amount for the transaction, the size
of the dealer’s initial holding, volatility, and the stock’s return (Stoll, 1978).
The bid-ask spreads that the dealer posts are affected not only by uncertainty
about the return on the inventory, but also from when the next transaction will occur.
Previous research has shown that the difference between bid and ask prices is given by a
risk neutral spread that maximizes expected profits in addition to a risk premium that
depends on previous factors discovered (Stoll, 1978), as well as the dealer’s attitude
toward risk (Ho and Stoll, 1980). Even though the dealer changes the price based on the
inventory that he has, the risk he has is greater than that shown in the one period model
by Stoll in 1978. This is because the uncertainty of the demand to trade with the dealer is
not completely eliminated by the aforementioned pricing strategy (Ho and Stoll, 1980).
This conclusion includes cases with an asymmetric demand for trading with the dealer
and cases where a dealer refuses to make a market (Ho and Stoll, 1980).
Besides determinants of bid-ask spreads, it is important to look at the
clearinghouse itself. Sara Reed in her thesis found that the establishment of the NYSE
clearinghouse reduces the spread. Once a firm joins the NYSE Clearinghouse, both its
relative and absolute spreads are narrowed, resulting in an overall decrease of 5.28%.
One strong reason why clearinghouses should inherently reduce trading costs is because
of netting. Since market makers can now hold less cash, their inventory costs are lower.
As a result, this is passed down in the form of lower bid-ask spreads to traders, assuming
there is competition among clearinghouses. The NYSE clearinghouse that was
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established in May 1892 was found to reduce spreads. That old system, now called the
Night Clearing Branch, was fairly effective, but the strain on American credit facilities
experienced during and after the Great War required the clearance system to clear the
cash value of security balances and of shifted security loans (Meeker, 1922). The netting
of cash values in the event that there were two or more different securities should have
saved a lot of time and labor. In the same way, the lower costs should translate into lower
costs for traders assuming some level of competition.
Previous research has explained many ways and discovered determinants that
affect bid-ask spreads. In this paper, we are examining the effect of the establishment of
the Day Clearing Branch of the Stock Clearing Corporation on spreads. Therefore, it is
important to control for factors that have been previously found to influence bid-ask
spreads.

IV. Data
In testing the efficiency of the Stock Clearing Corporation on financial markets,
the bid-ask spreads of the NYSE stocks must be examined both before and after the
enactment of the Day Clearing Branch on April 26, 1920. The data that is being used can
be found in historical New York Times under the stock quotes section. Through
accessing this database, three components are required: the NYSE transactions, the
closing quotations for stocks that did not trade that day, and the information about the
Consolidated Exchange. During the year 1920, stocks also traded on Saturday; therefore
the data is from newspapers from Tuesday to Sunday (excluding holidays).
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The NYSE transactions have information on the closing bid-ask prices as well as
the high, low, and last transaction. For the stocks that did not trade that day, there are
closing bid and ask prices as well. There is similar information for the Consolidated
Exchange. It is important to look at stocks that did not trade that day, because if there was
a narrower bid ask spread, maybe there would be more transactions and those stocks
would have been able to trade.
The dependent variable in the regressions is bid-ask spread. The essential
explanatory variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 0 before the establishment
of the Stock Clearing Corporation and a value of 1 after, designated MUTUALIZATION.
Because of the supposed increase of liquidity from the establishment of this branch, there
should be a negative correlation between spreads and this dummy.
As stated in the lit review, there are many other factors that affect the bid-ask
spread and it is important to control for them. One example is the call loan interest rate,
which may have needed to have been controlled for in the event of stocks not entering
and exiting at the same time. However, in this scenario, all the mutualization of risk
happened at the same time when the Day Clearing Branch was established, so this
variable need not be included.
As a benchmark to the stocks on the NYSE, the stocks on the Consolidated are
used. The use of a dummy that takes the value of 0 if it is not on the Consolidated and 1 if
it trades on that exchange is used to control for differences in the bid-ask spreads that
exist simply because they are two different exchanges. The Consolidated did not establish
a branch similar to the Day Clearing Branch to increase efficiency, so there should be a
negative correlation between this dummy and the dependent variable.
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Data was collected for all stocks trading on the NYSE and the Consolidated for
the months of January through November of 1920. The bid, ask, date, volume, and last
trade were inputted for all 150,000 observations through the use of Data Entry Services.
The first step was to group everything by the company that issued the stock. Because
many securities were listed multiple ways (i.e. GM, General Motors, etc.), an ID was
given to each security as to avoid confusion. When preferred and common stock were
both listed on the exchange, they were given two separate identifications. After grouping
the observations, it was clear that many of these data points were not able to be used due
to a number of factors.
Many of the observations were missing a bid or an ask price due to one of two
reasons. Either during that day there actually was no bid or ask, or that the old copy of the
1920 NY Times newspaper made that value impossible to read. All of these observations
were removed. The difficulty in viewing the old newspapers also resulted in some
incorrect values for the bids and asks. Observations with a higher bid than ask were also
removed. In the 1920s, bids and asks were announced in multiples of 1/8, so any
observation that was not divisible by 1/8, such as 1/3, were also taken out. One problem
with the NY Times newspapers were errors in reporting. On certain days, stock names or
their corresponding values were listed incorrectly. In order to make sure that these did not
affect the results, observations that were either more than 120% than the previous day or
less than 80% of the previous day were carefully examined. In some instances, these
observations were preserved due to the low stock price. For example, a jump from $4.00
to $4.25 would be flagged and left in while a stock that jumped from $100 to $120 would
be taken out. After all these changes, about 127,000 data points remained.
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To have a closer look at the effect of mutualization of risk, a data set with the 50
observations before April 26 and the 50 observations after was created for each stock.
Those that joined the NYSE later in the year or exited the NYSE early and therefore did
not have both 50 observations before and 50 observations after that date were removed
from the data set. All in all, there were 489 different securities remaining and therefore
48,900 observations in this new data set.
There are however, shortcomings to this method of analysis. When comparing the
data before and after April of 1920, we are assuming that other factors which affect bidask spreads are constant. One example of this may be simply an increase in aggregate
demand over time. This discrepancy in macroeconomic factors can contribute to a change
in bid ask spreads and trading volume even though that is not what this study is trying to
measure.

V. Results and Analysis
The effect of the Day Clearing Branch of the Stock Clearing Corporation on bidask spreads was investigated. The spread incorporates market efficiency due to its
definition: it is the difference between the highest price a buyer is willing to pay and the
lowest price a seller is willing to ask for. In the regression, explanatory and dummy
variables were used, as formerly stated in Section IV. All regressions were run with
ordinary least squares (OLS). The initial regression forms were as follows:
SPREAD = αi + MUTUALIZATION Dummy + CONSOLIDATED Dummy +
ε
AND
PERCENTSPREAD= αi + MUTUALIZATION Dummy + CONSOLIDATED
Dummy + ε
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Dummy variables were also included in order to capture variables with only
two possible results. The most important variable, the MUTUALIZATION dummy, took
the value of 1 after April 26, 1920, when the Day Clearing Branch was established and
the mutualization of risk occurred, and took the value of 0 before. The
CONSOLIDATED variable took on the value of 1 if a firm’s securities traded on the
Consolidated Exchange and a value of 0 if they did not.
The regression that was initially run consisted of all the securities that were not
erroneous nor had missing values. This consisted of all listed securities from January to
November. When regressing SPREAD against the MUTUALIZATION dummy and the
CONSOLIDATED dummy, both dummies took on a negative coefficient like expected.
The table is shown in the Appendix. However, the MUTUALIZATION dummy had a pvalue of 0.934 (clearly not statically significant). The regression was then run again with
PERCENTSPREAD replacing the SPREAD variable and this time the
MUTUALIZATION dummy had a value of 0.0081 and had a p-value close to 0. This is
surprising because it had been expected that this dummy would have been negative. The
results are again shown in the Appendix. Since the bids and asks ranged from $1 to over
$1000, the spreads also had a great range, which had affected the first regression.
Therefore, PERCENTSPREAD was shown to be a more accurate dependent variable.
These same regressions were then run with the data set consisting of 50
observations before the date of April 26 and 50 observations after. In addition, the largest
5 spreads per firm were removed in order to prevent outliers from affecting the data.
When using SPREAD as the dependent variable, the MUTUALIZATION dummy this
time was positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The
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CONSOLIDATED dummy was negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. When using PERCENTSPREAD, both the MUTUALIZATION and
CONSOLIDATED dummies were significant at the 1 percent level. Both tables can be
found in the Appendix.
Because the MUTUALIZATION variable had been expected to be negative,
more regressions were run examining the possibility of a difference between
Consolidated and non-Consolidated firms. The regressions were rerun, but now with an
additional variable, MUTUALIZATION*CONSOLIDATED.
SPREAD = αi + MUTUALIZATION Dummy + CONSOLIDATED Dummy +
MUTUALIZATION*CONSOLIDATED + ε
AND
PERCENTSPREAD= αi + MUTUALIZATION Dummy + CONSOLIDATED
Dummy + MUTUALIZATION*CONSOLIDATED + ε

When the dependent variable SPREAD was used, the cross between these two
dummies was not significant at the 10% level. However, when PERCENTSPREAD was
used, this new variable had a negative coefficient and was statistically significant. Next,
regressions were run separating Consolidated and non-Consolidated firms using
PERCENTSPREAD as the dependent variable and the MUTUALIZATION dummy as
the independent variable. When using only non-Consolidated firms, the coefficient came
out to be 0.014, and when using only Consolidated firms, it was 0.0050. Both were
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Therefore, the bid-ask spreads increased
almost three times as much for stocks that were only trading on the NYSE.
With this same data set, the medians of bid-ask spreads were also looked at in
an attempt to remove any remaining outliers that could have affected the previous
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regressions. The medians for each security were calculated, both before the date of
mutualization and after. They were then compared in order to determine whether or not
spreads had increased or decreased. Out of all the firms, 227 had increased median
spreads, 137 had stayed the same, and 125 had decreased. This confirmed the results
from the previous regressions by showing that spreads had in fact increased more often
than they decreased.
Since volume traded is also a determinant of liquidity, it was also closely
examined for these securities. An average trading volume was calculated for each
security both before April 26 and after. The difference between the two averages for each
security was calculated. For all firms that traded on the NYSE, 111 had increases in
trading volume, 25 stayed the same, and 353 had decreases in trading volume.
Consolidated and non-Consolidated firms were also looked at separately in order to
determine the distribution of these changes in trading volume. For Consolidated firms,
only 8 firms had increased whereas 125 firms had decreased. For non-Consolidated firms,
103 had increased volume, 25 had remained the same, and 228 had decreased. For those
firms that had not changed their volume traded, most of them had no trades before and
after the mutualization because of the disparity in the bid and the ask. By separating the
Consolidated and non-Consolidated firms, it is easy to tell that the mutualization of risk
increased volume for many more non-Consolidated firms (the less liquid ones). In fact,
some of those securities did not have a single trade before April 26, and through the
mutualization, had trades after that date.
A Chi-Squared test was run with 1 degree of freedom for both the change in
median spread as well as the change in volume traded. The null hypothesis had p1 = p2 =
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0.5, and the alternate hypothesis was that these probabilities were not true. The Chisquared statistic, Q, was calculated as follows:
Q = Σ (Ni - np0i)2/np0i
This test yielded chi-squared statistics of 59.658 for the median and 121.041 for the
volume. Both of these tests clearly disproved the null hypothesis and supported the
previous findings of changes in these two determinants of market efficiency.
These results were a stark contrast to what was expected to be true. The
regressions showed a statistically significant positive correlation between mutualization
and the bid-ask spread both in percentage and absolute terms, implying that after the
mutualization of risk on the NYSE, the bid-ask spreads widened. Furthermore, the
trading volume was shown to decrease through a Chi-squared test for both Consolidated
and non-Consolidated firms. These results demonstrated that the efficiencies that were
imparted into the Clearinghouse were not passed down to traders during the initial year of
the mutualization of risk. It is possible that these efficiencies were realized at a later
period in time.

VI. Conclusion
This paper opens up other areas of future study, most prominently in the
derivatives market, where there has been discussion of more regulation. Credit Default
Swaps (CDS) make up tens of trillions of dollars globally making them the most
widespread, unregulated credit derivatives on the market. The Financial Crisis in 2008
was caused in part by a credit crunch as the increase of counterparty risk made actors
more reluctant to deal, effectively deterring private capital from entering to restore viable
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but damaged institutions (Claessens, 2009). Due to the connectedness of financial
institutions to financial markets, the plunge of the CDS market led to the ultimate
collapse of American International Group (AIG) and Lehman Brothers. Many credible
economists support the idea of implementing a clearinghouse for over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives to insure payment even in the event of a default. Duffie and Zhu (2009)
examined whether or not a central clearinghouse of a particular class of derivatives
lowers counterparty risk. In that paper, they showed that the separate central clearing
counterparties (CCP) when clearing one class of derivatives could reduce netting
efficiency, leading to higher expected counterparty exposures and collateral demands. In
addition, when multiple derivatives classes are cleared, it is always more efficient to clear
them on the same CCP rather than on different CCPs (Duffie et al, 2009).
With more historical data on the different securities on the NYSE clearinghouse,
it is possible to expand on this paper by examining broader and longer trends. Also, one
could look at other clearinghouses for other exchanges such as the Chicago Clearing
Corporation and examine the effect of their clearing methods on bid-ask spreads. In
addition, the data could be expanded to include others as a comparison such as the Curb
Exchange as well as other exchanges during a different time period when the
Consolidated was closed. The model could be re-examined by including more variables
that were perhaps omitted. One such variable is interest rates. It is possible that inclusion
of this variable could increase the R2 and perhaps explain the unexpected results.
Nevertheless, through regression analysis, the implementation of the Day Clearing
Branch of the NYSE Clearinghouse was shown to be statistically significant, resulting in
the widening of bid-ask spreads and the decrease in volume traded.
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Appendix
Table 1 – List of Variables
Variable
SPREAD

Definition
the absolute spread measured by the ask minus the bid
the spread as a percentage of the last trade of the midpoint of the bid/ask if no
PERCENTSPREAD trades that day
MUTUALIZATION dummy that is 0 before April 26 and 1 after
CONSOLIDATED
dummy that is 0 if not on the Consolidated Exchange and 1 if it is
MUTUAL*CONS
product of MUTUALIZATION and CONSOLIDATED dummies

Table 2 – Spread in Absolute and Percentage Terms from January to November
Spread and percentspread were regressed on the mutualization and consolidated
dummies in (1) and (2) for all data from January to November. The cross between these
two dummies was included for (3) and (4).
(1)
VARIABLES

SPREAD

(2)
PERCENTSPREA
D

mutualization

-0.0039
(0.047)
-3.623***
(0.051)

0.0082***
(0.001)
-0.059***
(0.001)

constant

4.272***
(0.041)

0.072***
(0.001)

-0.0162
(0.055)
-3.653***
(0.086)
0.0459
(0.107)
0.072***
(0.001)

Observations
R-squared
Adj R-Squared

126869
0.0384
0.0384

126869
0.0589
0.0589

126869
0.0384
0.0384

consolidated
mutual*cons

(3)

(4)

SPREAD

PERCENTSPREAD
0.0093***
(0.001)
-0.057***
(0.001)
-0.0043***
(0.001)
0.071***
(0.001)
126869
0.0590
0.0590

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 3 – Spread in Absolute and Percentage Terms for 50 observations before and
after
Spread and percentspread were regressed on the mutualization and consolidated
dummies in (1) and (2) for 50 observations before and 50 after April 26, 1920. The cross
between these two dummies was included for (3) and (4).

(1)
VARIABLES

SPREAD

(2)
PERCENTSPREA
D

mutualization

0.1820**
(0.077)
-3.591***
(0.087)

0.0097***
(0.001)
-0.058***
(0.001)

constant

4.078***
(0.059)

Observations
R-squared
Adj R-Squared

46455
0.0358
0.0357

consolidated

SPREAD

(4)
PERCENTSPREA
D

0.067***
(0.001)

0.2442***
(0.090)
-3.478***
(0.122)
-0.2289
(0.173)
4.047***
(0.063)

0.0122***
(0.001)
-0.530***
(0.001)
-0.0094***
(0.002)
0.066***
(0.001)

46455
0.0669
0.0668

46455
0.0358
0.0358

46455
0.0670
0.0670

mutual*cons

(3)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 4 – Spread in Absolute and Percentage Terms for non-Consolidated firms
only
Spread and percentspread were regressed on the mutualization dummy for 50
observations before and 50 after April 26, 1920 for non-Consolidated firms only.

VARIABLES
mutualization
constant

Observations
R-squared
Adj R-Squared

(1)
SPREAD

(2)
PERCENTSPREAD

0.1781
(0.111)
4.365***
(0.078)

0.0136***
(0.001)
0.070***
(0.001)

35600
0.0001
0.0000

35600
0.0033
0.0033

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Table 5 – Spread in Absolute and Percentage Terms for Consolidated firms only
Spread and percentspread were regressed on the mutualization dummy for 50
observations before and 50 after April 26, 1920 for Consolidated firms only.

VARIABLES
mutualization
constant

Observations
R-squared
Adj R-Squared

(1)
SPREAD

(2)
PERCENTSPREAD

0.0713
(0.050)
0.648***
(0.035)

0.0050***
(0.002)
0.015***
(0.001)

13300
0.0002
0.0001

13300
0.0007
0.0007

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 6 – The Change in Volume
Change in volume for all stocks, Consolidated stocks, and non-Consolidated
stocks

Increase
Same
Decrease

All
Stocks
111
25
353

Consolidated
8
0
125

NonConsolidated
103
25
228

Table 7 – The Median Change in Spread
Change in median spread for all stocks, Consolidated stocks, and nonConsolidated stocks

Increase
Same
Decrease

Number of Stocks
227
137
125

Table 8 – Chi Squared Test
Median and Volume Chi-square statistics. Test is run with 1 df.
H0: p1 = 0.5 and p2 = 0.5
Median
Q

Volume

59.658

121.041
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